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Abstract
A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-
dimensional payoff is introduced. It is based on extensions of the vector order
in RK to order relations in the power set of RK , so-called set relations, and
strictly motivated by the interpretation of the payoff as multi-dimensional
loss for one and gain for the other player. The new concept provides coher-
ent worst case estimates, i.e. minimax and maximin strategies, for games
with multi-dimensional payoffs. It is shown that–in contrast to games with
one-dimensional payoffs–minimax/maximin strategies are independent from
Shapley’s notion of equilibrium strategies for such games. Therefore, the two
concepts are combined into new equilibrium notions for which existence the-
orems are given. By means of examples, relationships of the new concepts to
existing ones such as Shapley and vector equilibria, vector minimax/maximin
solutions and Pareto optimal security strategies are clarified. A algorithm for
computing optimal strategies is presented.
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1 Introduction
This note is an attempt to provide novel answers to the question what should
actually be played in games in which the players have incomplete preferences for
the payoffs, i.e. there are non-comparable alternatives. Our findings indicate that
previously defined extensions of Nash equilibria to the case of vector-valued payoffs
or utility functions are not the only natural path to follow as done in [2, p. 311]:
‘There is a natural way of extending the standard notion of Nash equilibrium’
to incomplete preferences. In particular, we will discuss that there might be other
‘incentives to deviate from her own action given every one else’s action’ ([2, p. 311])
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than just (strictly) improving the multi-dimensional payoff/utility with respect to
the underlying vector order or (non-complete) preference.
Incomplete preferences and their representation came more into focus of the
economic literature in the past two decades. Aumann [1] (in search for a utility
representation theory without the completeness axiom as the ‘most questionable’)
and Bewley [3] (in search for a model that would make precise the difference between
risk and uncertainty) raised the issue. Compare Ok et al [31] for a synthesis of these
approaches. Representation results for incomplete preferences via families of utility
functions were given by Ok [30], Dubra et al [11], Evren, Ok [14], Bosi, Herden [5]
along with the perspective that vector optimization might be useful for solving the
resulting multi-utility maximization problems: ‘Moreover, as it reduces finding the
maximal elements in a given subset of X with respect to  to a multi-objective
optimization problem (cf. cf. Evren and Ok, 2011), in applications, this approach
is likely to be more useful than the Richter-Peleg approach.’ However, to the best of
our knowledge, up to now there is no (expected) multi-utility maximization theory
with results comparable to the scalar case. Rather, even in recent applications, a
real-valued multi-attribute utility function is assumed to model the preference of
a decision maker even in the highly complex framework of financial markets with
frictions (cf. Campi, Owen [6]).
A major motivation for investigating incomplete preferences stems from social
choice theory. The reader may compare Eliaz and Ok [12] (and the references
therein) where the difference between indifference and indecisiveness is discussed
as well as the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) which almost forces a
complete preference. It is shown that a weakened version of WARP is perfectly
compatible with incomplete preferences, and the methodology given in this paper
admits to distinguish between cases in which the decision maker is indifferent and
cases in which (s)he is indecisive.
The theory proposed here gives a different perspective to the very same phe-
nomena. It is shown that players may deviate from an equilibrium by “free will,”
i.e. they may want to move to another equilibrium which produces a payoff which
is not comparable to the first for reasons which are not part of the mathematical
model. Seen in this way, the interpretation is very close to a literal understanding
of the word “incomplete” as, for example, discussed in Carlier, Dana [7]. Our novel
contribution can be summarized as follows: “Set relations” (extensions of the vector
order for the payoffs to the power set of possible payoffs) are used for giving the
players a guidance through the jungle of the many (non-comparable) equilibrium
values with respect to the vector order, and, for the first time, well-motivated worst
case estimates are provided which correspond to the von Neumann minimax and
maximin strategies in the one-dimensional payoff case.
We use one of the easiest problems involving incomplete preferences as a show
case for the set relation approach to game theory, namely a two-player, zero-sum
matrix game where the utility function for each player just is, admitting mixed
strategies, her/his expected vector-valued gain.
Already Shapley [32, p. 58] (see also Aumann [1, p. 447]) gave a motivation for
studying games with multi-dimensional payoffs: ‘The payoff of a game sometimes
most naturally takes the form of a vector having numerical components that repre-
sent commodities (such as men, ships, money, etc.) whose relative values cannot be
ascertained. The utility spaces of the players can therefore be given only a partial
ordering (representable as the intersection of a finite number of total orderings), and
the usual notions of solution must be generalized.’ However, the theory even for
“simple” zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs is far from being
complete in a way which parallels the elegant von Neumann approach in the scalar
case. The earliest proposal by Blackwell [4] generalized the notion of the value of a
game to an “approachable set” apparently motivated by the fact that, in contrast
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to the classic von Neumann situation, insisting on a single payoff (vector) as value
of the game does not make much sense for games with vector payoffs.
Shapley [32] introduced an equilibrium notion which relies on the order generated
by the positive cone in the images space. His concept indeed admitted to ‘utilize the
theory of vector optimization (multi-objective programming)’ (cf. Ok [30, p. 433]),
and it was put into the context of vector optimization as vector equilibrium points
or vector saddle points, see Nieuwenhuis [29, Definition 3.1], Corley [9, (5)], Luc
and Vargas [27], Tanaka [34] as well as many others. Compare the survey Tanaka
[35] and the references therein as well as Zhao [39] where general multi-objective
games are considered and more references can be found.
However, it turned out that, despite this effort, vector optimization did not yet
provide a satisfying equilibrium theory, not even for two-player, zero-sum matrix
games with vector-valued payoffs/utilities.
What are the reasons for the lack of an appealing and applicable, multi-dimensional
equilibrium theory under incomplete preferences?
One difficulty is the sheer number of “Shapley equilibrium values.” Shapley’s
main result [32, Theorem] reduces a zero-sum matrix game with vector payoffs
to infinitely many scalar non-zero-sum games. In most cases, this produces just
too many candidates for a solution and ‘the impossible task of solving all possible
scalarizations’ as remarked by Corley [9, Section 4]. In a more general context, Bade
[2, p. 328] observed the same: ‘Since Nash equilibrium sets of games with incomplete
preferences can be large, it is of interest to consider refinements of equilibria . . .’ We
refer to De Marco, Morgan [10] for a discussion of several approaches and references.
The idea is to impose additional requirements to the equilibrium [10, page 171]
‘which adds to the original problem new endogenous parameters that are typical for
the vector-valued form.’ However, the questions then asked are almost exclusively
the one for the existence of such refined equilibria and the one for stability with
respect to some class of perturbations. In the context of vector optimization, similar
scalarization results can be found, for example, in Zeleny [37] (basically, already
Shapley’s result), Cook [8] (minimizing the weighted underachievement of goals)
and Wierzbicki [36] (via nonlinear scalarization functions). Zhao’s notion of Nash
equilibria [39, Definition 12] is based on properly efficient points which can also be
found via linear scalarizations.
Another, even more important difficulty is that Shapley equilibria are missing
two main features of equilibrium strategies for scalar games. They are not inter-
changeable, and they do not provide worst case estimates.
The missing interchangeability was observed by Corley [9, Example 3.2] (see
Example 2.15 below), and contradicts Aumann’s belief that ‘the interchangeability
property holds’ (cf. Aumann [1, p. 455]) for Shapley equilibrium strategies. There-
fore, a “best possible answer” to an equilibrium strategy is not necessarily a “best
possible answer” to another which leaves the question completely open what kind of
strategy protects a player best against the opponent’s choices. Below, the meaning
of “best” will be scrutinized, and it will be given a new meaning via a set relation
approach.
The missing worst case insurance motivated (sightly deviating from each other)
concepts of vector minimax and maximin strategies as discussed, for example, by
Nieuwenhuis [29], Corley [9] and Tanaka [33]. The relationship to the previously
introduced vector equilibrium/saddle points remained obscure as observed by Corley
[9, Section 4]: ‘Second, it is not clear how minimax and maximin points are related
to equilibrium points, except that a joint minimax and maximin point is obviously
an equilibrium point.’ Moreover, the interpretation as a worst case insurance failed
as remarked by Nieuwenhuis [29, p. 473]: ‘Whereas the notions of minimax point
and maximin point do not seem to have an easy game-theoretic interpretation, the
notion of saddle point has.’
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An attempt to resolve this issue by “brutal force” was given by Ghose and
Prasad [18], called Pareto optimal security strategies (POSS). It relies on the idea
of providing insurance against the component-wise worst cases, see Ghose [17],
Fernandez, Puerto [15], Fernandez et al [16] for more details, and leads to very
conservative strategies which make little sense in many cases (see Section 3 below).
The third major difficulty is more mathematical in nature. It boils down to the
fact that the infimum and the supremum with respect to vector orders (or even more
general preferences) are of no use in most cases. Either they do not exist since the
(vector) order is not a lattice order, or even if they do, they produce “ideal points”
which in many cases are not attainable payoffs. The two difficulties described above
of generalizing the von Neumann minimax theory to non-complete orders can be
attributed to this feature.
Our approach via set relations opens a way out of this dilemma and is strictly
motivated by the interpretation of the payoff as multi-dimensional loss for one and
gain for the other player. We introduce a new solution concept for two-player,
zero-sum matrix game where main tools are taken from the recently developed
theory of set optimization [20], but different “set orders” as, for instance, in [28] are
used. Examples illustrate relationships to previous solution concepts and provide
evidence that optimal strategies as introduced below indeed should be played if the
players wish to achieve “best” protection against losses, and it is easily seen that
they enjoy the interchangeability property. By combining the new concept with
Shapley’s equilibrium notions, new equilibrium concepts are obtained for which
existence theorems are given. Finally, an algorithm for computing such strategies
is presented and discussed.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the new solution concept
is introduced, and existence theorems for corresponding equilibrium notions are
provided. In Section 3 the new concept is compared with others from the literature.
Section 4 is devoted to an algorithm for computing optimal strategies, and in Section
5 some numerical results are reported. The appendix contains a few crucial concepts
from set optimization and also introduces some notation which is used in the paper.
We recommend to browse it first in particular to readers who are not familiar with
set relations.
2 A new solution concept
Let K ≥ 1 be an integer and z ∈ RK be an element of the K-dimensional vector
space of column vectors with real components. We write z = (z1, z2, . . . , zK)
T where
the upper T indicates the transpose of the row vector. Let G = (gij)m×n be an
m× n matrix whose entries
gij =
(
g1ij , g
2
ij , . . . , g
K
ij
)T ∈ RK
are K-dimensional column vectors of real numbers. We interpret G as a loss matrix
for the row-choosing player I. Independently, player I and the column-choosing
player II select a row i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a column j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, respectively,
which results in player I delivering gij to player II with the usual convention that
negative delivery is something that I receives from II. A possible interpretation of
the payoff vectors gij is, of course, that the K components of gij denote units of
K different assets, so I hands II a portfolio instead of an amount of one particular
currency.
As usual in the theory of finite matrix games, we consider mixed strategies.
Player I chooses row i with probability pi and player II column j with probability
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qj . The two sets
P =
{
p ∈ Rm+ |
m∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
and Q =
q ∈ Rn+ |
n∑
j=1
qi = 1

model the admissible (mixed) strategies of the two players. If player I chooses
strategy p ∈ P and player II q ∈ Q, then the expected (vector) loss of player I is
v(p, q) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pigijqj ∈ RK .
The set
V = {v(p, q) | p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}
is in fact a (possibly non-convex) subset of the convex hull of the entries of the
matrix G.
Different from the scalar case, it is not a priori clear what kind of order should be
used for comparing the (expected) payoffs. It would be reasonable to assume that
each player has a preference for the payoffs and that these preferences are different
from each other–as in Bade [2], but in contrast to references like Nieuwenhuis [29],
Tanaka [34] where a general partial order in RK is used which is the same for both
players. The point of view in this note is that it is only known to the players that
player I prefers“less loss” and player II prefers“more gain.”
Therefore, it is assumed that both players’ decisions are consistent with the
partial order ≤RK+ generated by the closed convex cone RK+ , i.e. for y, z ∈ RK
the symbol y ≤RK+ z means z − y ∈ RK+ , and that no other information about the
preferences of the players is available. This is “Shapley’s assumption” [32, p. 59]:
‘It is also assumed that the first player wants to increase the components of the
vector, and the second player wants to decrease them. Finally, it is assumed that
neither player has an a priori opinion concerning the relative importance to himself
of the different components.’
Let player I choose a strategy p ∈ P . If for another strategy p′ ∈ P it holds
∀q ∈ Q : v(p′, q) ≤RK+ v(p, q),
then clearly p′ is better than p for player I. In this case, we write p′ ≤I p. In case
of
∀q ∈ Q : v(p′, q) = v(p, q),
the strategies p, p′,∈ P are considered to be equivalent and we write p′ =I p. It
is natural to determine minimal elements with respect to the order ≤I and the
equivalence relation =I . We say p ∈ P is ≤I-minimal if
(p′ ∈ P, p′ ≤I p) =⇒ p′ =I p.
Likewise, we introduce ≤II , =II and ≤II-maximality for player II.
It turns out, however, that the orders ≤I and ≤II are not “rich enough”–there
are just too many ≤I -minimal and ≤II -maximal elements since many cannot be
compared with each other.
Example 2.1 In the game given by
G =

(
0
0
)(
4
4
)
(
3
1
)(
1
3
)

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any two strategies p, p′ ∈ P are not comparable with each other with respect to the
≤I-order, and hence they are all ≤I-minimal. Indeed, choosing q¯ = (1, 0)T we have
v(p, q¯) =
m∑
i=1
pigi1 = p2 ·
(
3
1
)
= (1− p1) ·
(
3
1
)
,
i.e., the larger p1 ∈ [0, 1] the smaller with respect to ≤RK+ is v(p, q¯). On the other
hand, taking qˆ = (0, 1)T we get
v(p, qˆ) =
m∑
i=1
pigi2 = p1 ·
(
4
4
)
+ p2 ·
(
1
3
)
,
i.e. the larger p1 ∈ [0, 1] the larger with respect to ≤RK+ is v(p, qˆ). This proves that
any two strategies p, p′ ∈ P are not comparable and hence all p ∈ P are ≤I-minimal.
On the other hand, consider the strategy p¯ = (0, 1)T for player I. Then
v(p¯, q) =
n∑
j=1
qjg2j = q1 ·
(
3
1
)
+ q2 ·
(
1
3
)
.
For any two different elements q, q′ ∈ Q, we have v(p¯, q) 6≤RK+ v(p¯, q′). Thus,
elements in q, q′ ∈ Q are never comparable with respect to ≤II , which shows that
all elements q ∈ Q are ≤II-maximal.
Even though, based on the order relations ≤I and ≤II , any strategy p ∈ P is
optimal for player I and any q ∈ Q is optimal for player II, a look at the payoff
matrix may convince the reader that it might be better for player I to favor the
second row and better for II to have a bias towards the second column.
The above example provokes the question which order relation should be used
instead. A minimal requirement certainly is that the order for player I maintains the
≤I -order, but strategies should be comparable more often. If player I picks strategy
p ∈ P , then her/his expected payoff belongs to the bounded convex polyhedron
vI (p) = {v(p, q) | q ∈ Q} = co
{
m∑
i=1
pigi1, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
pigin
}
. (2.1)
For given two strategies p, p′ ∈ P , the main idea is to compare the sets vI(p)
and vI(p
′) by an appropriate set relation. For some introductory remarks on set
relations, the reader is referred to the appendix. We define
vI(p) 2 vI(p′) :⇐⇒ vI (p′) ⊆ vI (p)− RK+ .
The following statement is now obvious.
Proposition 2.2 Let p, p′ ∈ P . If p′ ≤I p, then vI (p′) 2 vI (p).
Another aspect is uncovered if one asks which expected payoffs player II can
generate if I plays p¯ ∈ P . The worst case scenario for player I is a maximal point
of vI(p¯), i.e. q¯ ∈ Q satisfying(
q ∈ Q, v(p¯, q¯) ≤RK+ v(p¯, q)
)
=⇒ v(p¯, q¯) = v(p¯, q).
In this case we write v(p¯, q¯) ∈ Max vI(p¯).
If player II knows the strategy p¯ of player I, then (s)he certainly will pick such a
maximal (= non-dominated) strategy. Thus, it might not be necessary to compare
all values {v(p¯, q) | q ∈ Q}, but only those which produce maximal elements.
The following result establishes a partial counterpart to Proposition 2.2.
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Proposition 2.3 If p, p′ ∈ P with vI (p′) 2 vI (p) and q ∈ Q with v(p, q) ∈
Max vI(p), then either v(p
′, q) ≤RK+ v(p, q) or v(p′, q), v(p, q) are not comparable
with respect to ≤RK+ .
Proof. Assume vI (p
′) ⊆ vI (p)−RK+ and v(p, q) ≤RK+ v(p′, q) for some v(p, q) ∈
Max vI (p). Then, by the first statement, there is q¯ ∈ Q such that v(p′, q) ≤RK+
v(p, q¯). Hence
v(p, q) ≤RK+ v(p
′, q) ≤RK+ v(p, q¯).
Since v(p, q) ∈ Max vI (p) this implies v(p, q) = v(p′, q) = v(p, q¯). 
Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 may be interpreted as follows: The transition from the
order ≤I in P to the set order 2 for the comparison of the values vI (p) does not
loose comparability, but may absorb some incomparable maximal elements. Thus,
the relation 2 produces never more, but often fewer minimal elements: in Example
2.1, all strategies p ∈ P are minimal with respect to the order ≤I , but not all are
for 2 (likewise for player II) as is explained in Example 2.7 below.
The above discussion almost forces the following set optimization approach to
zero-sum matrix games with vector payoff. Consider the set-valued map defined by
VI (p) := vI (p)− RK+ .
Formally, VI can (and will) be understood as a function mapping P into G(RK ,−RK+ ) ={
A ⊆ RK | A = cl co (A− RK+ )
}
(see appendix for more details).
The set VI (p) includes all potential losses for the first player which are less than
or equal to vI (p) and thus also absorbs losses generated by “gifting” something to
player II. This is just a version of the standard free disposal condition in economics,
see [19, p. 131]. A strategy p′ clearly is preferable over p for player I if VI (p′) ⊆
VI (p), i.e. one can reach the losses in VI (p
′) from those in VI (p) by gifting–which
usually does not happen. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.4 A strategy p¯ ∈ P is said to be minimal for player I if there is no
p ∈ P with
VI (p) ⊆ VI (p¯) and VI (p) 6= VI (p¯) .
The set of minimal strategies of player I is denoted by MIN(I).
In the light of the previous discussion, a minimal strategy is a worst case in-
surance: The maximal loss, expected to be a maximal point in vI(p), should be as
“small” as possible which is, in the sense of Definition 2.4, the case if the set VI (p¯)
is as “small” as possible. Since ⊆ is, in general, a non-total partial order, this means
VI (p¯) is a minimal element with respect to ⊆.
It is important to note that minimal strategies are independent of the choice of
the second player–in contrast to all Nash-type equilibrium notions in the literature
(unless the preference is complete).
Remark 2.5 If K = 1, then vI(p) = {v(p, q) | q ∈ Q} and
VI(p) = vI(p)− R+ = max
q∈Q
v(p, q)− R+.
Thus, a minimal strategy p¯ ∈ P satisfies
VI(p¯) = min
p∈P
max
q∈Q
v(p, q)− R+ = max
q∈Q
v(p¯, q)− R+,
i.e. it is a minimax-strategy for player I.
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A parallel discussion can be done for player II. With
vII (q) = {v(p, q) | p ∈ P} = co

n∑
j=1
qjg1j , . . . ,
n∑
j=1
qjgmj

it is clear that player II wants to “maximize” the set-valued function q 7→ vII (q).
The extension of the order ≤II on Q is the set relation 4 for comparing the values
of vII , which are again convex bounded polyhedra. We define
vII(q
′) 4 vII(q) :⇐⇒ vII (q) ⊆ vII (q′) + RK+ .
Of course, there are analogous statements to Propositions 2.2 and 2.3.
A set-valued map is defined by
VII (q) := vII (q) + RK+ .
Formally, it is a function VII : P → G(RK ,RK+ ) =
{
A ⊆ RK | A = cl co (A+ RK+ )
}
(see appendix). It provides the counterpart for VI with a similar interpretation.
Definition 2.6 A strategy q¯ ∈ Q is said to be maximal for player II if there is no
q ∈ Q with
VII (q) ⊇ VII (q¯) and VII (q) 6= VII (q¯) .
The set of maximal strategies of player II is denoted by MAX(II).
Parallel to Remark 2.5, if K = 1 a maximal strategy is a maximizer of the
function q → minp∈P v(p, q), i.e. a maximin strategy. This shows that for K = 1
the above concepts boil down to the classic von Neumann approach. An additional
(duality) argument is needed to show that the two problems are dual to each other
and have the same value.
Example 2.7 Consider the game of Example 2.1 above. An easy calculation shows
that
MIN(I) =
{
p ∈ P ∣∣ 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1
3
}
and MAX(II) =
{
q ∈ Q∣∣ 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1
2
}
.
The strategy pˆ = ( 23 ,
1
3 )
T is not minimal for player I; the worst case expected pay-
off is Max vI(pˆ) = (3,
11
3 )
T . By playing the minimal strategy p¯ = ( 13 ,
2
3 )
T with
VI(p¯) ⊂ VI(pˆ) player I can reduce her/his worst case expected payoff to Max vI(p¯) =
(2, 103 )
T . On the other hand, there does not exist another strategy p¯ ∈ P satisfying
Max vI(p¯) ⊆ vI(p¯) − RK+ , i.e. it is not possible for player I to guarantee a worst
case expected payoff strictly better than (2, 103 )
T without generating other potential
expected payoffs which are not comparable to (2, 103 )
T (and hence might be chosen
by II).
Another link to set relations should be pointed out. It holds
VI (p) =
⋃
q∈Q
[
v(p, q)− RK+
]
= sup
q∈Q
{
v(p, q)− RK+
}
where the supremum is understood in (G(RK ,−RK+ ),⊆), see the appendix for the
definition (closure and convex hull can be dropped from the supremum formula as
v(p, ·) is linear and Q is a convex polyhedron). Since according to Definition 2.4,
player I looks for minimizers of the function VI , her/his problem can be understood
as a version of worst case analysis: the worst loss (as described by the supremum)
should be minimized.
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Completely parallel to the scalar case, one can look for the infimum of VI , i.e.
VI = inf
p∈P
sup
q∈Q
{
v(p, q)− RK+
}
=
⋂
p∈P
⋃
q∈Q
[
v(p, q)− RK+
]
. (2.2)
This makes sense since
(G(RK ,−RK+ ),⊆) is a complete lattice (see Proposition 6.1 of
the appendix). The corresponding problem for player II is to look for the supremum
of VII in
(G(RK ,RK+ ),⊇), i.e.
VII = sup
q∈Q
inf
p∈P
{
v(p, q) + RK+
}
=
⋂
q∈Q
⋃
p∈P
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
. (2.3)
These two problems are posed in two different image spaces and with respect to
different order relations. Therefore, they do not produce a common equilibrium
value and cannot be dual–in the sense of linear programming duality–at least not
in the same way as the corresponding problems in the scalar case.
In general, the outer infimum in (2.2) and the outer supremum in (2.3) are not
“attained” in a single strategy. Therefore, it cannot be expected that there is a
single payoff (vector) which can be considered as the value of the game, and hence
there is a multitude of optimal strategies for each player leading to different (non-
comparable) payoffs. This is the reason why infimum and supremum in (2.2) and
(2.3) are replaced by minimality and maximality notions as introduced in Defini-
tions 2.4 and 2.6. However, one can show that the sets of minimal and maximal
strategies are non-empty and form solutions of the set optimization problem (2.2)
and (2.3), respectively, in the sense of [22, Definition 2.7] (compare Definition 6.2
in the appendix). The following theorem provides the essence of the argument.
Theorem 2.8 For each (p, q) ∈ P × Q there exists (p¯, q¯) ∈ MIN(I) × MAX(II)
with VI(p¯) ⊆ VI(p) and VII(q¯) ⊆ VII(q).
Proof. This follows from Proposition 5.15 in [22], which states that the dom-
ination property (i.e. for every x ∈ X there exists a minimal point y ∈ f [X] :=
{f(x) | x ∈ X} with y ≤ f(x)) holds for a function f : X → Z, where X is a com-
pact topological space and (Z,≤) a partially ordered set, whenever f is level-closed.
The latter means that for all z ∈ Z the level sets Lf (z) := {x ∈ X | f(x) ≤ z} are
closed. The proof for level-closedness is subject to the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.9 The two functions VI : P →
(G(RK ,−RK+ ),⊆) and VII : Q→ (G(RK ,RK+ ),⊇)
are level-closed.
Proof. The proof is given for VI and runs in a similar way for VII .
Take A ∈ G(RK ,−RK+ ) and
{
p`
}
`=1,2,...
⊆ P with lim
`→∞
p` = p¯ in P such that
VI(p
`) ⊆ A for all ` = 1, 2, . . . Then,
∀p ∈ P : VI(p) = co
{
m∑
i=1
pigi1, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
pigin
}
− RK+ . (2.4)
Thus, for all ` = 1, 2, . . .,
∀j = 1, . . . , n :
m∑
i=1
p`igij ∈ A.
Since A is closed, the same holds for the limit:
∀j = 1, . . . , n :
m∑
i=1
p¯igij ∈ A.
Now, VI(p¯) ⊆ A follows from (2.4) and A ∈ G(RK ,−RK+ ). 
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Remark 2.10 In the sense of Definition 6.2 below, the set MIN(I) even is a full
solution of problem (2.2), and the set MAX(II) is a full solution of problem (2.3).
Assume that the players pick (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q. What could be an incentive for
player I to switch to another strategy in P?
First, there is a strategy p˜ ∈ P satisfying Max vI(p˜) − RK+ ⊂ Max vI(p¯) − RK+
(strict inclusion). This means vI(p˜) − RK+ ⊂ vI(p¯) − RK+ since, due to the upper
domination property (see appendix), vI(p) − RK+ = Max vI(p) − RK+ for all p ∈ P .
The switch to p˜ would avoid some potential losses for player I and thus improve
her/his worst case estimate (compare Example 2.7).
Secondly, such an incentive is v(p¯, q¯) 6∈ Min vII(q¯), i.e. there is a strategy p ∈ P
such that v(p, q¯) ∈ vII(q¯) with v(p, q¯) ≤RK+ v(p, q¯) and v(p, q¯) 6= v(p¯, q¯). In this case,
it makes sense to look for pˆ ∈ P such that v(pˆ, q¯) ∈ Min vII(q¯). Such a pˆ always
exists since the set vII(q) satisfies the lower domination property (see the appendix
for a definition) for all q ∈ Q.
The first case means that p¯ is not minimal for player I. In the second case (p¯, q¯)
is not a Shapley equilibrium strategy (compare the following definition) which may
happen even if p¯ is minimal (see Example 3.5). On the other hand, a strategy
can produce a Shapley equilibrium, but not be minimal (see Example 3.4). The
following two definitions are motivated by these considerations.
Definition 2.11 A pair (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is called a Shapley equilibrium if
v(p¯, q¯) ∈ Max vI(p¯) ∩Min vII(q¯).
It is called a strong Shapley equilibrium if
VI(p¯) ∩ VII(q¯) ⊆ Max vI(p¯) ∩Min vII(q¯).
Since
Max vI(p) ∩Min vII(q) ⊆ VI(p) ∩ VII(q)
is always true, the condition for a strong Shapley equilibrium in (p¯, q¯) actually
means
VI(p¯) ∩ VII(q¯) = Max vI(p¯) ∩Min vII(q¯).
While Shapley equilibria have been defined in Shapley [32], strong Shapley equi-
libria seem to be a new concept. Clearly, a strong Shapley equilibrium also is
a Shapley equilibrium. While the former produces a payoff which cannot be im-
proved by either player with respect to the chosen strategies, the latter produces
payoffs which cannot be improved with respect to the worst case estimate.
The reader is referred to Example 2.15 (v) which shows that there are Shapley
equilibria which are not strong. Clearly, the feature of being “strong” can be con-
sidered as a refinement of a Shapley equilibrium. However, no additional exogenous
or ‘endogenous parameters’ ([10, page 171]) are introduced to the problem which is
in contrast to previous approaches.
Remark 2.12 Shapley equilibria can be found by solving non-zero-sum scalar games.
More precisely, a pair (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a Shapley equilibrium if, and only if, there
are α, β ∈ intRK+ such that p¯ is optimal for player I for the scalar game with the
payoff matrix containing the entries αT gij, and q¯ is optimal for player II for the
game with the matrix βT gij. This was established in [32, Theorem]. Note that
Shapley denoted such an equilibrium as a Strong Equilibrium Point (SEP).
As already remarked, minimal/maximal strategies provide worst case payoff
estimates for each player independent of the choice of the other. Therefore, mini-
mal/maximal strategies are (trivially) interchangeable. On the other hand, Shapley
equilibrium strategies involve both players and finding them is a recursive proce-
dure; interchangeability is violated as already shown by Corley [9, Example 3.2].
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Definition 2.13 A pair (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q is called a set relation equilibrium if p¯ is
minimal and q¯ is maximal.
A set relation equilibrium (p¯, q¯) is called a set Shapley equilibrium if it is also
is a Shapley equilibrium.
A set relation equilibrium (p¯, q¯) is called a strong set Shapley equilibrium if it
is also is a strong Shapley equilibrium.
Definition 2.13 can be understood as an equilibrium version of the definition
of solutions for set optimization problems due to Heyde and Lo¨hne in [22] (see
Definition 6.2 in the appendix). The two features “being minimal/maximal” and
“attaining an equilibrium value” are no longer equivalent as in the scalar case.
Example 2.15 (v) and Example 5.1 below show that a set Shapley equilibrium
does not need to be strong.
The following theorem ensures the existence of (strong) set Shapley equilibria.
Theorem 2.14 For every zero-sum matrix game with vector payoffs there exists a
strong set Shapley equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the scalar zero-sum matrix game given by the matrix(
K∑
k=1
gkij
)
m×n
= (eT gij)m×n,
where e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RK and let (pˆ, qˆ) be an equilibrium point for this game, the
existence of which follows from linear programming duality. The expected payoff ν
for the scalar game is related to the payoff v of the game with vector payoffs by
ν(p, q) :=
∑
i,j
pi(e
T gij)qj = e
T
∑
i,j
pigijqj = e
T v(p, q).
Since (pˆ, qˆ) is an equilibrium for the scalar game, we have
t := ν(pˆ, qˆ) = max
q∈Q
ν(pˆ, q) = min
p∈P
ν(p, qˆ).
This can be written as
t = max
y∈vI(pˆ)
eT y = min
y∈vII(qˆ)
eT y.
Because of maxy∈−RK+ e
T y = miny∈RK+ e
T y = 0, this is equivalent to
t = max
y∈VI(pˆ)
eT y = min
y∈VII(qˆ)
eT y.
We conclude
VI(pˆ) ⊆ H− :=
{
y ∈ RK | eT y ≤ t} and VII(qˆ) ⊆ H+ := {y ∈ RK | eT y ≥ t} .
By Theorem 2.8 there exists (p¯, q¯) ∈ MIN(I) ×MAX(II) with VI(p¯) ⊆ VI(pˆ) and
VII(q¯) ⊆ VII(qˆ). Thus
VI(p¯) ⊆ H− and VII(q¯) ⊆ H+.
One has v(p¯, q¯) ∈ VI(p¯) ∩ VII(q¯) ⊆ H− ∩H+ =: H. Hence
t = eT v(p¯, q¯) = max
y∈VI(p¯)
eT y = min
y∈VII(q¯)
eT y.
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The well-known characterization of a vector minimum (and a vector maximum) by
a weighted sum scalarization, see e.g. Zeleny [38], Ehrgott [13], yields
v(p¯, q¯) ∈ Max vI(pˆ) ∩Min vII(qˆ).
Thus, (p¯, q¯) is an equilibrium. 
The concepts are illustrated by means of the following example which is a version
of Corley [9, Example 3.2] adapted to our setting.
Example 2.15 The following facts can be verified for the game given by
G =

(
1
0
)(
0
0
)
(
0
1
)(
1
0
)
 .
(i) The set of minimal strategies is MIN(I) = {p ∈ P | 0 < p1 ≤ 1} and the set
of maximal strategies is MAX(II) =
{
q ∈ Q | 12 ≤ q1 ≤ 1
}
.
(ii) The pairs (p¯, q¯) =
(
(1, 0)T , (1, 0)T
)
and (pˆ, qˆ) =
((
1
4 ,
3
4
)T
,
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)T)
are
Shapley equilibria. Moreover, (p¯, q¯) is a strong set Shapley equilibrium, see Figure
2.1 (left).
(iii) The pair (p¯, qˆ) is minimal/maximal, but not a Shapley equilibrium, hence
not a set Shapley equilibrium. Therefore, there is an incentive for player II to change
to q¯ with v(p¯, q¯) = (1, 0)T instead of v(p¯, qˆ) = (34 , 0)
T , see Figure 2.1 (central).
(iv) The pair (p˜, q¯) with p˜ = (0, 1)T and v(p˜, q¯) = (0, 1)T is a Shapley equilib-
rium, but p˜ is not minimal. There is an incentive for player I to switch. Since
player II can generate any payoff in vI(p˜) by an appropriate choice of q ∈ Q, a
switch to p ∈ P with p1 ∈ (0, 12 ) would reduce the degree of freedom for player II
considerably, and if p1 ∈ [ 12 , 1] is chosen by player I, the choice of player II is even
forced (if player II always plays“rational,” i.e. maximal points in vI(p)) to generate
v(p, q) = (1− p1, p1)T as this is the only maximal point in vI(p) for p1 ≥ 12 .
(v) The pair (p, q) with p = (1/8, 7/8)T and q = (5/8, 3/8)T is minimal/maximal,
a Shapley equilibrium, but not a strong one (see central figure below). Moreover, p is
minimal, qˆ is maximal, so (p, qˆ) also is a set Shapley equilibrium, but not a strong
set Shapley equilibrium. Figure 2.1 (right) shows VI(p) and VII(qˆ) whose inter-
section has a non-empty interior and thus includes non-minimal and non-maximal
points of vI(p) and vII(qˆ), respectively.
Again, a strong set Shapley equilibrium can be considered as a refinement of a
set Shapley equilibrium.
The question arises if the players have an incentive to switch if they find them-
selves in a (set) Shapley equilibrium which is not strong. In particular, the players
might be tempted to aim for a payoff in (VI(p¯) ∩ VII(q¯)) \ {v(p¯, q¯)} in case (p¯, q¯) is
a (set) Shapley equilibrium, but not a strong one. Although it is not possible to
achieve a strictly better payoff, a player might be attracted by an alternative pay-
off which is not comparable to v(p¯, q¯) for reasons which are not part of the model
so far. The limit is set by the following claim: If y ∈ (VI(p¯) ∩ VII(q¯)) \ {v(p¯, q¯)},
then y is not comparable to v(p¯, q¯). Indeed, if v(p¯, q¯) ≤RK+ y, then there would be
y¯ ∈ Max vI(p¯) with v(p¯, q¯) ≤RK+ y ≤RK+ y¯, so v(p¯, q¯) 6∈ Max vI(p¯) which contradicts
the assumption. A similar argument works for y ≤RK+ v(p¯, q¯).
The potential transition from such a payoff v(p¯, q¯) to another one in VI(p¯)∩VII(q¯)
might occur due to the ‘taste’ of a player in the sense of Ok et al [31] if one interprets
the expected gain as her/his utility function.
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Figure 2.1: The sets VI(p) and VII(q) for certain strategy pairs (p, q). Left: strong
set Shapley equilibrium from Example 2.15 (ii); central: the minimal/maximal
strategy pair of Example 2.15 (iii) is not a Shapley equilibrium; right: the set
Shapley equilibrium from Example 2.15 (v) is not a strong set Shapley equilibrium.
3 Relationships to other solution concepts
3.1 Minimax and maximin strategies
First, we will compare minimal and maximal strategies to so-called vector minimax
and maximin strategies. Both concepts are in some sense a transfer of worst case
estimates from the one-dimensional to the multi-dimensional payoff case.
A strategy p¯ ∈ P is called a minimax strategy if there is q¯ ∈ Q such that
v(p¯, q¯) ∈ Min
⋃
p∈P
wMax vI(p).
Vice versa, a strategy q¯ ∈ Q is called a maximin strategy if there is p¯ ∈ P such that
v(p¯, q¯) ∈ Max
⋃
q∈Q
wMin vII(q)
Here wMin and wMax refer to maximal and minimal points with respect to the
cone {0}∪ intRK+ which usually are called weakly maximal and weakly minimal, re-
spectively. Minimax and maximin strategies can be understood as “vector criterion
solutions” of the set-valued optimization problems
minimize p 7→ wMaxwvI(p) and maximize q 7→ wMinwvII(q)
over p ∈ P and q ∈ Q, respectively. This means, one looks for minimal and maximal
points of the union of all function values, compare Hamel et al [20, p. 80, (III)] and
the references therein for a discussion of this concept. The above definition can be
found in Tanaka [34], for example. Earlier definitions differ insofar as sometimes
minimax strategies include “outer” weakly minimal and weakly maximal points as
in Nieuwenhuis [29] or drop the “weak” concept altogether as in Corley [9]. The
latter case is denoted as strong minimax and maximin strategies.
The sets of minimax and maximin payoffs do not coincide in general, and they are
also different from the vector saddle point payoffs. This has been observed by Corley
[9] and Nieuwenhuis [29] (see Section 1). Tanaka [34] provides sufficient conditions
for the existence of two–in general different–minimax and maximin payoffs.
The following examples show that minimax/maximin strategies on the one hand
and minimal/maximal strategies on the other hand form independent concepts in
general.
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Example 3.1 Consider again the game of Example 2.1 above.
The set of minimax strategies is
{
(0, 1)T , ( 13 ,
2
3 )
T
} ⊂ MIN(I), the set of maximin
strategies is
{
q ∈ Q | 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 12
}
= MAX(II) (this is also the set of all strong
maximin strategies).
The set of strong minimax strategies is P 6⊆ MIN(I) since (2, 2)T ∈ vI(p) for all
p ∈ P , and this point belongs to Max vI(p) for all p ∈ P with 0 ≤ p1 < 13 .
Example 3.2 Consider again the game from Example 2.15.
The set of all minimax strategies is
{
(1, 0)T
}
which is included in the set of all
minimal solutions. The set
{
p ∈ P | 0 ≤ p1 < 12
}
is strongly minimax, and this set
is neither included, nor does it include the set of minimal solutions. This also shows
the possible “jump” behavior of the change from minimax to strongly minimax.
The set of all maximin as well as the set of strongly maximin strategies is Q, so
MAX(II) is a strict subset of the set of maximin strategies.
By the way of conclusion, the minimax and maximin concepts from vector op-
timization do not provide a coherent worst case analysis, i.e. they do not yield
bounds for worst possible payoffs. Moreover, they can differ significantly from min-
imal and maximal solutions. On the other hand, minimal and maximal strategies
in the sense of Definition 2.4, 2.6 have a clear game-theoretic interpretation since
they provide worst case bounds for the players.
3.2 Shapley equilibria
For α, β ∈ RK+ we define
sαI := inf
p∈P
sup
q∈Q
∑
i, j
piα
T gijqj and s
β
II := sup
q∈Q
inf
p∈P
∑
i, j
piβ
T gijqj .
A strategy p¯ ∈ P is called Shapley solution for player I if there is α ∈ intRK+ such
that
sαI = sup
q∈Q
∑
i, j
p¯iα
T gijqj ,
and q¯ ∈ Q is called Shapley solution for player II if there is β ∈ intRK+ such that
sβII = inf
p∈P
∑
i, j
piα
T gij q¯j .
A pair (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q of Shapley solutions forms a Shapley equilibrium (compare
Remark 2.12).
For A ⊆ RK , we consider the following scalarization functionals which are both
versions of the support function of A:
σ+A(α) := sup
x∈A
αTx and σ−A(β) := inf
x∈A
βTx.
For a collection {Ai}i∈I of sets in RK we have (compare e.g. [20, Lemma 4.14])
σ+⋃
i∈I Ai
= sup
i∈I
σ+Ai and σ
−⋃
i∈I Ai
= inf
i∈I
σ−Ai .
It follows that
σ+VI(p)(α) = sup
q∈Q
∑
i, j
piα
T gijqj and σ
−
VII(q)
(β) = inf
p∈P
∑
i, j
piβ
T gijqj .
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Hence
sαI = inf
p∈P
σ+VI(p)(α) and s
β
II = sup
q∈Q
σ−VII(q)(β).
On the one hand, this shows that Shapley equilibria are related to a scalarization
of VI(p) and VII(q), respectively. On the other hand our optimality concepts can
also be characterized in terms of σ+, σ−.
Proposition 3.3 A strategy p¯ ∈ P is minimal for player I if, and only if,
(p ∈ P, VI(p) 6= VI(p¯)) ⇒
(
∃α ∈ RK+ : σ+VI(p)(α) > σ
+
VI(p¯)
(α)
)
.
Likewise, a strategy q¯ ∈ Q is maximal for player II if and only if
(q ∈ Q, VII(q) 6= VII(q¯)) ⇒
(
∃β ∈ RK+ : σ−VII(q)(β) < σ
−
VII(q¯)
(β)
)
.
Proof. This follows from the equivalence
A 2 B ⇐⇒ σ+A ≤ σ+B ,
for σ+A defined on RK+ . Likewise, we have
A 4 B ⇐⇒ σ−A ≤ σ−B
for σ−A defined on RK+ . 
The next two examples show that our optimality notions are independent from
the Shapley optimality concept.
Example 3.4 If p¯ ∈ P is a Shapley solution for player I, then it is not necessarily
minimal. Indeed, if
G =

(
0
0
) (
0
0
)
(
1
−1
) (−1
1
)
 ,
then p¯ = (0, 1)T is a Shapley solution for player I (with respect to α = (12 ,
1
2 )), but
it is not minimal in the sense of Definition 2.4, since VI(1, 0) ( VI(0, 1). In fact,
VI(1, 0) =
{(
0
0
)}
− R2+ and VI(0, 1) = co
{(
1
−1
)
,
(−1
1
)}
− R2+.
Example 3.5 If p¯ ∈ P is minimal for player I in the sense of Definition 2.4, it is
not necessarily a Shapley solution. Indeed, if
G =

(
0
0
) (
3
−3
)
(−3
3
) (
0
0
)
(
1
1
) (
1
1
)

,
then the strategy p¯ = (0, 0, 1)T is minimal, but not Shapley: Consider the sets
VI(1, 0, 0) = co
{(
0
0
)
,
(
3
−3
)}
− R2+, VI(0, 1, 0) = co
{(−3
3
)
,
(
0
0
)}
− R2+,
15
as well as
VI(0, 0, 1) =
{(
1
1
)}
− R2+
and take into account the above scalarization results. It is easy to see that p¯ is not
a Shapley solution. Assume that p¯ is not minimal. Then there is some p ∈ P with
VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) and VI(p) 6= VI(p¯). Then we have
∀q ∈ Q : p1
(
3
−3
)
q2 + p2
(−3
3
)
q1 + p3
(
1
1
)
∈
{(
1
1
)}
− R2+.
Since q1 + q2 = 1 we obtain
(−3p1 − 3p2)q1 ≤ 1− p3 − 3p1,
(3p1 + 3p2)q1 ≤ 1− p3 + 3p1
for all q1 ∈ [0, 1]. This system is satisfied if and only if the first inequality holds for
q1 = 0 and the second one for q1 = 1. Thus, it is equivalent to
p3 + 3p1 ≤ 1,
p3 + 3p2 ≤ 1.
It follows that p = (0, 0, 1)T , which shows that p¯ is minimal.
3.3 Maeda’s bi-matrix games with set payoffs
Maeda [28] introduced different concepts of “equilibrium points” for bi-matrix games
with set payoffs. If one specializes these concepts to the setting of this note, one
may see that Maeda’s maximal Nash equilibrium is closely related to, but different
from the optimality concepts introduced and motivated in the previous section. We
shortly recall some definitions and results from [28] using our notation and our
setting of assumptions.
A bi-matrix game with set payoffs is defined by an m× n matrix the entries of
which are pairs (Aij , Bij) of sets Aij , Bij ⊆ RK . Mixed strategies are considered
which results for player I in an expected payoff
vI(p, q) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piAijqj ⊆ RK
and for player II in
vII(p, q) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piBijqj ⊆ RK .
Both players maximize their expected payoffs. By considering the singleton sets
Aij = {−gij} Bij = {gij}
we obtain a zero-sum game with vector payoff, as considered in this article.
Maeda [28] argues that each player can choose a set relation. In particular,
the set relation 4 (“L-type”) and 2 (“U-type”) as introduced in Section 2 are
suggested as candidates for preferences of the players. Moreover, the “LU-type”
relation, which is defined by the requirement that both 4 and 2 are satisfied, is
suggested. The definitions of various types of equilibrium points as well as corre-
sponding existence results are given in [28, p. 320] under the assumption that ‘both
players [. . .] are LU type and this is a common knowledge for the players.’
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In [28, Definition 4.1], a Nash equilibrium strategy is introduced. In our setting
this is a pair (p∗, q∗) ∈ P ×Q such that
∀p ∈ P : p∗ ≤I p and ∀q ∈ Q : q ≤II q∗.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy was shown under a very strong as-
sumption, which is not fulfilled, for instance, in Example 2.1. We have shown that
any two strategies for I are not comparable (likewise for II) and hence there is no
Nash equilibrium strategy. This problem has been also addressed in [28, Example
4.2], and for this reason other concepts have been introduced. A maximal Nash
equilibrium strategy (compare [28, Definition 4.2]) is (in our setting) a pair (p∗, q∗)
such that vI(p
∗) is minimal and vII(q∗) is maximal with respect to a set relation.
But as mentioned above, this set relation is supposed to be of LU-type, whereas
in our concept player I has to use 2 (U-type) and player II has to use 4 (L-type).
This choice is basically forced by the interpretation of the payoff as loss for player I
and gain for player II, and it is also of practical relevance as the following example
shows.
Example 3.6 Consider the game
G =

(
2
−1
) (−1
2
)
(
0
0
) (
0
0
)
 .
For p ∈ P and q ∈ Q we have
vI(p) = co
{
p1
(
2
−1
)
, p1
(−1
2
)}
,
vII(q) = co
{(
0
0
)
, q1
(
2
−1
)
+ q2
(−1
2
)}
One can easily verify that for any two different p, p′ ∈ P , the sets vI(p), vI(p′) are
not comparable with respect to 4. But using the relation 2, for p∗ = (0, 1)T we
have
∀p ∈ P : vI(p∗) 2 vI(p) and ∀p ∈ P \ {p∗} : vI(p∗) 2 vI(p)
On the other hand, for any two different q, q′ ∈ Q, the sets vII(q), vII(q′) are not
comparable with respect to 2. For the relation 4, setting Q∗ =
{
q ∈ Q | 13 ≤ q1 ≤ 23
}
we have
∀q, q′ ∈ Q∗ : vII(q) 4 vII(q′) and vII(q′) 4 vII(q).
Moreover we have
∀q ∈ Q, ∀q∗ ∈ Q∗ : vII(q) 4 vII(q∗).
We conclude the following for player I: While with our approach only p∗ = (0, 1)T
is optimal, using the LU-type ordering yields that all p ∈ P are optimal. For player
II it is similar: For our approach the strategies in Q∗ are optimal, but using the
LU-type ordering all strategies q ∈ Q are so.
We conclude that using the LU-type ordering may not provide any information
to the players. It is, however, quite obvious that a loss averse player I should prefer
to choose the second row. Not so obvious, but equally motivated, is that the strategies
in Q∗ are preferable for player II.
The example shows that existence results for optimality notions of games with
vector and set payoff are not sufficient for their justification. It is rather important
to ensure that not too many optimal strategies exist and that the concepts come
along with a clear motivation and interpretation.
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3.4 Pareto optimal security strategies (POSS)
Assume that player I picks strategy p ∈ P . The set
WI(p) :=
⋂
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
contains all expected losses which player I can suffer by choosing strategy p inde-
pendently of player II’s choice. The addition of the convex cone RK+ reflects the
fact that player I always can ‘gift something” to II. It makes sense to make this set
as “big” as possible, i.e. include as many potential losses as possible since then the
chance that there are “small ones” among them is bigger. Thus, it makes sense to
look for ⋃
p∈P
⋂
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
.
Up to a closure and a convex hull, this expression coincides with
inf
p∈P
sup
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
where inf and sup are understood in
(G(RK ,RK+ ),⊇) (see appendix). The expres-
sion
⋂
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
is not changed if Q is replaced by the set if its vertices,
hence we get ⋃
p∈P
⋂
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
=
⋃
p∈P
⋂
j∈{1,...,n}
[
m∑
i=1
pigij + RK+
]
.
We also conclude that the set
{
(z, p) ∈ RK × P | z ∈WI(p)
}
is closed and (polyhe-
dral) convex. Moreover, P is compact. Now it is easy to see that the closed convex
hull in the definition of the infimum can be omitted here, i.e., we have
inf
p∈P
sup
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
=
⋃
p∈P
⋂
q∈Q
[
v(p, q) + RK+
]
.
If, as usual, player I tries to minimize her/his maximal expected loss (s)he is led
to the following G(RK ,RK+ )-valued problem: Find
WI = inf
p∈P
sup
j∈{1,...,n}
[
m∑
i=1
pigij + RK+
]
=
⋃
p∈P
⋂
j∈{1,...,n}
[
m∑
i=1
pigij + RK+
]
.
Definition 3.7 A strategy p¯ ∈ P is called a Pareto optimal security strategy (POSS)
for player I if there is no p ∈ P satisfying
WI (p) ⊇WI (p¯) and WI (p) 6= WI (p¯) .
The set of POSS for player I is denoted by POSS(I).
Player II proceeds in a similar way. The set
WII (q) :=
⋂
p∈P
[
v(p, q)− RK+
] ∈ G (RK ,−RK+ )
includes all potential gains for her/him including those obtained by “giving up
something for free,” and this set should be “as big as possible.” So, player II is
faced with the problem to find
WII = sup
q∈Q
inf
i∈{1,...,m}
 n∑
j=1
qjgij − RK+
 = ⋃
q∈Q
⋂
i∈{1,...,m}
 n∑
j=1
qjgij − RK+
 .
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Definition 3.8 A strategy q¯ ∈ Q is called a Pareto optimal security strategy (POSS)
for player II if there is no q ∈ Q satisfying
WII (q) ⊆WII (q¯) and WII (q) 6= WII (q¯) .
The set of POSS for player II is denoted by POSS(II).
The previous two definitions are versions of Definition 4.1 in Ghose, Prasad [18]
adopted to our setting. The following results are well-known, see Fernandez, Puerto
[15, Theorem 3.1].
Proposition 3.9 Define the two sets
SI =
{
(p, y) ∈ Rm × RK | y ≥
m∑
i=1
pigij , j = 1, . . . , n, p ≥ 0, eT p = 1
}
SII =
(p, y) ∈ Rm × RK | y ≤
n∑
j=1
gijqj , i = 1, . . . ,m, q ≥ 0, eT q = 1

Then,
WI = {y | (p, y) ∈ SI}+ RK+ and WII = {y | (p, y) ∈ SII} − RK+ .
The result means that Pareto optimal security strategies as well as the sets
WI ,WII can be obtained by solving two linear multi-criteria optimization problems
(MLOP). This is important for computational approaches. Moreover, the POSS
approach is related to the concepts introduced in Section 2 as follows.
Proposition 3.10 It holds
∀p ∈ P, ∀q ∈ Q : WII (q) ⊆ VI (p) ,
∀p ∈ P, ∀q ∈ Q : VII (p) ⊇WI (q) .
Moreover, VII ⊇ WI and WII ⊆ VI .
Proof. Everything is immediate from the definitions. 
The next result shows that, as a rule, optimal strategies are not worse than
POSS with respect to their payoffs, compare also Example 5.1 below. Therefore,
one may guess that optimal strategies even lead to better worst case estimates for
the expected payoff, and this is indeed the case for many examples.
Theorem 3.11 It holds
∀p ∈ MIN(I) : VI(p) ∩
(WI + RK+ \{0}) = ∅,
∀q ∈ MAX(II) : VII(q) ∩
(WII − RK+ \{0}) = ∅.
Proof. Fix p¯ ∈ P . According to (2.1), one has
VI(p¯) = co
{
m∑
i=1
p¯igi1, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
p¯igin
}
− RK+ .
Assume there is
z ∈ VI(p¯) ∩
(WI + RK+ \{0}) .
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Then there exist p ∈ P and c ∈ RK+ \{0} such that both is satisfied z ∈ VI(p¯) and
z − c ∈
⋂
j∈{1,...,n}
[
m∑
i=1
pigij + RK+
]
.
This implies
VI(p) = co
{
m∑
i=1
pigi1, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
pigin
}
−RK+ ⊆ {z − c}−RK+ ( {z}−RK+ ⊆ VI(p¯).
Thus p¯ is not minimal for player I, which proves the first claim. The second state-
ment can be shown analogously. 
By the way of conclusion, POSS can also be obtained by a set optimization ap-
proach, but are different from minimal/maximal strategies in general. Example 5.1
below illustrates the results of this section and shows that Pareto optimal security
strategies are very often too conservative as a worst case estimate.
4 How to compute optimal strategies
The procedure for player I is based on optimality tests for strategies p ∈ P . As there
are infinitely many such strategies, one has to choose a finite subset P¯ of P first. The
finite family T = {VI(p) | p ∈ P¯ ∩MIN(I)} of payoff sets with respect to optimal
strategies is presented to player I who acts as a decision maker. Assuming that the
finitely many optimal strategies found in this way provide a good representation of
all optimal strategies, player I can use all the information of the finite family T of
polyhedral convex sets to select one optimal strategy p∗ to play.
The question to be raised is how such a minimality test can be implemented.
Assume we want to test whether or not some p¯ ∈ P belongs to MIN(I). We have
VI(p¯) =

m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
p¯igijqj
∣∣ q ≥ 0, eT q = 1

where e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rn. In the first step we compute an H-representation of
the convex polyhedron VI(p¯), that is, we compute H ∈ Rs×m, h ∈ Rs such that
VI(p¯) =
{
y ∈ RK | Hy ≥ h} .
Secondly, we describe the condition VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) by linear inequalities with respect
to variables p ∈ P .
Proposition 4.1 For any p ∈ P , the following is equivalent:
(i) VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯)
(ii) p is feasible for the system of linear inequalities
H ·
(
m∑
i=1
pigij
)
≥ h, j = 1, . . . , n. (4.1)
Proof. We have
VI(p) = co
{
m∑
i=1
pigi1, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
pigin
}
− RK+
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for all p ∈ P . Thus, (i) is satisfied if and only if all points occurring in the convex
hull expression belong to VI(p¯). 
We intend to test whether or not there is p ∈ P such that VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) and
VI(p) 6= VI(p¯). This will be done by solving a linear program. We already know
that p ∈ P and VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) can be described by linear inequalities. It remains to
find a linear inequality description of the condition VI(p) 6= VI(p¯). To this end we
compute the vertices y1, . . . , yr of the polyhedral convex set VI(p¯).
Proposition 4.2 Let p, p¯ ∈ P and VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯). Then the following is equivalent:
(i) VI(p) 6= VI(p¯)
(ii) There exists a vertex yi of VI(p¯) such that y
i 6∈ VI(p).
Proof. Obviously, (ii) implies (i). Assume that (ii) is not true, i.e., all vertices of
VI(p¯) belong to VI(p). Since VI(p)− RK+ = VI(p) and
VI(p¯) = co
{
y1, . . . , yr
}− RK+ ,
we obtain VI(p) ⊇ VI(p¯) and hence VI(p) = VI(p¯). 
For each vertex y` (` = 1, . . . , r) of VI(p¯) we now compute a supporting hyper-
plane
H` =
{
y ∈ RK | (c`)T y = γ`
}
to VI(p¯) with the property
VI(p¯) ∩H` =
{
y`
}
. (4.2)
For the representation of H` we assume that
∀y ∈ VI(p¯) : (c`)T y ≥ γ`.
By similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 we conclude from VI(p) ⊆
VI(p¯) that
∀j = 1, . . . , n : (c`)T
m∑
i=1
pigij ≥ γ`. (4.3)
If for some p ∈ P with VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯), some ` ∈ {1, . . . , r} and some ε` > 0 the
linear system
∀j = 1, . . . , n : (c`)T
m∑
i=1
pigij ≥ γ` + ε` (4.4)
is satisfied, then the vertex y` of VI(p¯) does not belong to VI(p). Using Proposition
4.2 we conclude VI(p) 6= VI(p¯). This means that p¯ 6∈ MIN(I).
Vice versa, let (4.4) be violated for all p ∈ P with VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯), all ` ∈
{1, . . . , r} and all ε > 0. By (4.3), for every p ∈ P with VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) and every
vertex y` of VI(p¯) there exists j(P,`) ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
(c`)T
m∑
i=1
pigij(P,`) = γ`.
By (4.2), this means that, for some fixed p, any vertex y` of VI(p¯) coincides with
some point of VI(p). In this situation we have VI(p) = VI(p¯) for all p ∈ P with
VI(p) ⊆ VI(p¯) and hence p¯ ∈ MIN(I).
The considerations above can be summarized as follows.
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Theorem 4.3 A strategy p¯ ∈ P for player I is a minimal strategy in the sense of
Definition 2.4 if, and only if, the following linear program has the optimal value
zero:
max
p,ε
r∑
`=1
ε` subject to (4.1), (4.4) and p ≥ 0, eT p = 1 (4.5)
where e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rm.
We close this section with some remarks on implementation details.
Remark 4.4 An H-representation as well as the vertices of VI(p¯) can be computed
by solving a multiple objective linear program (MOLP). The vertices are obtained
from the primal problem and an H-representation from the dual problem. Moreover,
the hyperplanes H` can be obtained in this way. Only one MOLP needs to be solved
to test some p¯ ∈ P for optimality. For more details, the reader is referred, for
instance, to [24].
Remark 4.5 Theorem 3.11 can be used to sort out some (but not all) non-optimal
strategies. To this end we need an inequality representation of WI (POSS payoffs),
say
WI =
{
y ∈ RK | Ay ≥ a} ,
which can be computed by solving a multiple objective linear program. This has to
be done only once. For some p¯, consider the following system of linear inequalities
with variables y ∈ RK and q ∈ Rn:
q ≥ 0, eT q = 1, y ≤
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
p¯igijqj , A(y − εe) ≥ a. (4.6)
The (small) parameter ε > 0 is used to take into account the exclusion of zero in the
term RK+ \ {0} in the formula of Theorem 3.11. If the linear system (4.6) is feasible,
then p¯ 6∈ MIN(I). Feasibility of (4.6) can be verified by solving an LP. This LP is
smaller than the LP in the optimality test. Moreover, it is not necessary to compute
an H-representation and the vertices of VI(p¯). Therefore it can be more efficient to
sort out some non-optimal strategies in a first step and to execute minimality tests
only for the remaining strategies.
Of course, the algorithm for player II is completely analogous. Our procedure
to test whether a pair (p, q) ∈ MIN(I)×MAX(II) is a set Shapley equilibrium uses
H-representations of VI(p) and VII(q), which already have been computed in the
optimality tests. To decide whether or not v(p, q) belongs to Max vI(p), consider
those inequalities of the H-representation of VI(p) in which equality holds for at
the point v(p, q). Let a be the sum of the outer normals of the corresponding
supporting hyperplanes. Then v(p, q) ∈ Max vI(p) if, and only if, a ∈ intRK+ .
Likewise, v(p, q) ∈ Min vII(q) can be checked.
In order to test whether or not a set Shapley equilibrium (p, q) even is a strong
set Shapley equilibrium, we note that the condition
VI(p) ∩ VII(q) ⊆ MaxVI(p) ∩MinVII(q)
is equivalent to
∀ε > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} : VI(p) ∩ (VII(q) + εek) = ∅ (4.7)
where ek denotes the k-th unit vector in RK . Again we use the H-representations
VI(p) =
{
y ∈ RK | Ay ≥ a} and VII(q) = {y ∈ RK | By ≥ b} and we consider the
linear program
max eT t subject to Ay ≥ a, B(y − t) ≥ b, t ≥ 0. (4.8)
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This LP is bounded (as VII(q) = vII(q) +RK+ and vII(q) is bounded) and the point
(y, t) = (v(p, q), 0) is feasible. The optimal value of (4.8) is zero if, and only if, (4.7)
holds.
5 Numerical results
The algorithm of the previous section has been implemented with GNU Octave,
version 4.2. We used the VLP-Solver Bensolve version 2.0.1 [26, 24] linked against
the GLPK library version 4.6 to compute an H-representation and the vertices of
VI(p¯), compare Remark 4.4. All computations were run on a computer with Intel R©
CoreTM M CPU with 1.2 GHz and 8GB of RAM .
To compute a finite representation of the set MIN(I), the set P is discretized
with a stepsize t > 0, i.e. optimality is tested over the finite set
P¯ = P ∩ {y ∈ RK | ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} , ∃zk ∈ Z : yk = zkt}
and likewise for player II.
Example 5.1 Let us consider the game
G =

(
5
0
) (−1
−5
) (
4
−4
)
(
2
−2
) (
2
−7
) (
2
2
)
(
0
−6
) (
6
−2
) (−2
4
)

.
The optimal strategies computed by our algorithm with stepsize t = 1/250 are shown
in Figure 5.1. Using stepsize t = 1/10 for I and t = 1/5 for II we obtain 7 minimal
strategies for I and 5 maximal strategies for II, compare Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Among
the resulting 35 pairs there are 10 set Shapley equilibria, two of them are tested
numerically to be strong set Shapley equilibria, see Table 5.1. In Figure 5.2, the
relation to POSS payoffs is shown.
pT qT type(
2
5 , 0,
3
5
)
(0, 0, 1) strong(
1
2 , 0,
1
2
)
(0, 0, 1) strong(
3
5 , 0,
2
5
)
(0, 0, 1) not strong(
7
10 , 0,
2
10
)
(0, 0, 1) not strong(
1
2 , 0,
1
2
) (
1
5 , 0,
4
5
)
not strong
pT qT type(
3
5 , 0,
2
5
) (
1
5 , 0,
4
5
)
not strong(
7
10 , 0,
2
10
) (
1
5 , 0,
4
5
)
not strong(
1
2 , 0,
1
2
) (
2
5 , 0,
3
5
)
not strong(
3
5 , 0,
2
5
) (
2
5 , 0,
3
5
)
not strong(
7
10 , 0,
2
10
) (
2
5 , 0,
3
5
)
not strong
Table 5.1: Set Shapley equilibrium points for Example 5.1 for stepsize t = 1/10 for
I and t = 1/5 for II.
Example 5.2 Consider a game where all components of gij ∈ RK are random
integer payoffs between -10 and 10. We consider various such games with m ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5} rows, n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} columns and solve these games by the algorithm
described in the previous section. For each choice of m,n,K we solve 5 random
instances. We use a discretization stepsize of t = 1/20. The average running times
for computing optimal strategies (without checking if any pairs are set equilibrium
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11
11
q1p1
q2p2
Figure 5.1: Optimal strategies of Example 5.1 for I (left) and II (right). The first
two components p1, p2 and q1, q2, respectively, of the strategies p ∈ P ⊆ R3 and
q ∈ Q ⊆ R3 are depicted. The dark gray area refers to optimal strategies and the
light gray to non-optimal. The black points are selected strategies the payoff of
which is depicted in Figure 5.2.
points) are displayed in Table 5.2. We observed that different instances of the same
dimension may lead to a large variety of percentage of optimal strategies among
all strategies considered. However, this had no significant influence on the running
times to compute optimal strategies. In the larger examples (K,m, n ≥ 4) the
number of optimal strategies often exceeds 103, hence more than 106 (sometimes
even more than 8 · 107) pairs have to be checked for being set Shapley equilibria
and strong set Shapley equilibria. For 105 pairs of our largest random example
(K = 5,m = 5, n = 5) we had a running time of 158 seconds.
K=2 n
m 2 3 4 5
2 0.2
3 0.6 1.7
4 3.9 7.8 14
5 18.8 23.5 43 78
K=4 n
m 2 3 4 5
2 0.4
3 2.0 4.7
4 14.4 20.2 45
5 68.1 105.8 186 358
K=3 n
m 2 3 4 5
2 0.3
3 1.6 3.4
4 7.6 10.0 30
5 47.1 62.0 102 186
K=5 n
m 2 3 4 5
2 0.4
3 2.0 5.7
4 16.1 29.6 65
5 99.6 136.5 238 514
Table 5.2: Running time (in seconds) for Example 5.2. The discretization stepsize
is t = 1/20. The average time of 5 random examples is displayed.
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WIWI
WIIWII
⋃
q∈MAX(II)
VII(q)
WII
⋃
p∈MIN(I)
VI(p)
WI
Figure 5.2: Payoffs for Example 5.1. The sets WI and WII are the payoffs corre-
sponding to POSS strategies. Top left, a selection of sets VI(p) for optimal strategies
p ∈ MIN(I) is depicted (only their boundaries are partially shown). The optimal
strategies refer to the seven black points in Figure 5.1 (left). Top right, the same is
shown for player II, and the picture is related to Figure 5.1 (right). By drawing the
payoffs for all optional strategies (bottom), one can see that, as stated in Theorem
3.11, the new approach leads to better results than POSS as even a “gap” between
the sets can be observed.
6 Conclusions and perspectives
A new solution concept for zero-sum matrix games has been introduced which trans-
fers the notions of minimax- and maximin-strategies from the one-dimensional to
the multi-dimensional payoff case; it yields interchangeable strategy pairs and worst
case estimates which should be played if the players are “loss averse” and do not
know anything about their preferences, but the fact that they prefer “less loss” and
“more gain.” The new concept uses set relations, but is based on the complete-lattice
approach to set optimization. Combining our minimal/maximal solutions with
(strengthened) versions of Nash-type equilibrium concepts for multi-dimensional
payoff games introduced by Shapley, we obtain new equilibrium concepts and show
existence.
Extensions are now possible to situations in which both players have prefer-
ences expressed by two potentially different convex cones CI , CII ⊂ RK . In fact,
this seems to be just a mathematical exercise since the corresponding concepts,
in particular set relations generated by arbitrary cones, are available (see Hamel
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et al [20]). Moreover, even the general situation as considered in Bade [2] is well
within reach since every preorder can be extended to set relations (not just vector
preorders).
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Appendix
For the readers convenience, the appendix summarizes basic concepts related to
vector and set orders as well as the complete lattice approach to set optimization.
Let C ⊆ RK be a closed convex cone satisfying C ∩ (−C) = {0}. Such a
cone generates a partial order on RK (i.e. a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric
relation) by
y ≤C z ⇔ z − y ∈ C,
and this order is compatible with the linear space operations on RK , i.e. ≤C is
a vector order. In general, (RK ,≤C) is not a lattice. Even if the infimum (or
the supremum) of a set A ⊆ RK exists, it can be “far away” from A: consider
C = R2+ and A =
{
z ∈ R2+ | z1 + z2 ≥ 2
}
whose infimum with respect to ≤R2+ is
z = 0 ∈ R2. Therefore, the predominant optimality notion in vector optimization
and multi-criteria decision making is based on minimal (or maximal) points.
A point z¯ ∈ A ⊆ RK is called minimal with respect to ≤C if
z ∈ A, z ≤C z¯ ⇒ z = z¯.
The set of minimal points of A is denoted by MinA. Likewise, the set MaxA of
maximal points is introduced.
The lack of a reasonable infimum/supremum with respect to vector orders is a
major motivation for introducing so-called set relations, see Kuroiwa et al [23] as
well as Hamel et al [20] for a recent survey with many references.
Let A,B ⊆ RK . By
A 4C B :⇔ B ⊆ A+ C and A 2C B :⇔ A ⊆ B − C
two “set relations” are defined which both are reflexive and transitive, but not
antisymmetric in general. Moreover, they are two different extensions of≤C : z ≤C y
⇔ {z} 4C {y} ⇔ {z} 2C {y}. Per se, these relations just shift the difficulty
of defining optimality from RK to its power set P(RK). Their value lies in the
possibility to construct complete lattices of sets based on their symmetric parts.
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Two sets A,B ⊆ RK are equivalent with respect to 4C , written A ∼ B, if
A 4C B 4C A. It can easily be shown that A ∼ B if and only if A + C =
B+C. Therefore, the set of equivalence classes with respect to ∼ can be identified
with P(RK , C) := {A ⊆ RK | A = A+ C}. Moreover, on P(RK , C) the relation
4C coincides with ⊇. Likewise, P(RK ,−C) :=
{
A ⊆ RK | A = A− C} can be
identified with the set of equivalence classes with respect to the symmetric part of
2C , and on P(RK ,−C) the relation 2C coincides with ⊆.
Moreover, both
(P(RK , C),⊇) and (P(RK ,−C),⊆) are complete lattices, i.e.
every set A ⊆ P(RK , C) has an infimum and a supremum in P(RK , C) as well
as every set B ⊆ P(RK ,−C). Thus, infimum and supremum become available
again without any restrictions, and this fact constitutes the major difference to
more traditional approaches in multi-objective and even set-valued optimization,
the latter only based on minimality/maximality with respect to the set relations
defined above. Compare the survey Hamel et al [20] for more details and references.
The applications in this paper involve convex (set-valued) functions and closed
convex sets. Therefore, the following two sets are introduced:
G(RK , C) := {A ⊆ RK | A = cl co (A+ C)}
G(RK ,−C) := {A ⊆ RK | A = cl co (A− C)}
where the usual conventions for the Minkowski addition of sets are used with the
extension ∅+A = A+ ∅ for all A ∈ P(RK).
Proposition 6.1 The pairs
(G(RK , C),⊇) and (G(RK ,−C),⊆) are complete lat-
tices with the following formulas for infimum and supremum: For A ⊆ G(RK , C),
inf A = cl co
⋃
A∈A
A and supA =
⋂
A∈A
A.
For B ⊆ G(RK ,−C),
inf B =
⋂
B∈B
B and supB = cl co
⋃
B∈B
B.
Proof. See, for example, [20]. 
Note that the formulas for inf and sup in (G (RK , C) ,⊇) and (G (RK ,−C) ,⊆)
are exchanged due to the change of the ordering relation.
A set A ⊆ RK is said to enjoy the lower domination property if for each z ∈ A
there is z¯ ∈ MinA with z¯ ≤C z. The upper domination property is defined parallel.
If A,B ⊆ RK satisfy the lower domination property, then
A 4C B ⇔ MinB ⊆ MinA+ C,
and if they satisfy the upper domination property, then
A 2C B ⇔ MaxA ⊆ MaxB − C.
It is well-known that A ⊆ RK satisfies the lower as well as the upper domination
property if it is compact, see e.g. [21].
The complete-lattice approach admits to provide precise solution concepts for
optimization problems with a vector- or set-valued objective function.
First, we provide a few basic concepts and facts on functions mapping into
complete lattices of sets. A function f : Rk → G(RK , C) is called convex if s ∈ (0, 1)
and x, y ∈ Rk imply
f(sx+ (1− s)y) ⊇ sf(x) + (1− s)f(y).
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If f : Rk → G(RK , C) is convex, then
inf
x∈Rk
f(x) = cl
⋃
x∈Rk
f(x)
since the set
⋃
x∈Rk f(x) already is convex as one easily checks.
A function g : Rk → G(RK ,−C) is called concave if s ∈ (0, 1) and x, y ∈ Rk
imply
sg(x) + (1− s)g(y) ⊆ g(sx+ (1− s)y).
Again, if g is concave, the set
⋃
x∈Rk g(x) is convex and the convex hull in the
formula for the supx∈Rk g(x) can be dropped.
Finally, a solution concept for set optimization problems is given which is due
to Heyde, Lo¨hne [22].
Definition 6.2 Let X be a nonempty set, (L,≤) a complete lattice and f : X → L
a function.
(a) A set M ⊆ X is called an infimizer for f if
inf
x∈M
f(x) = inf
x∈X
f(x).
(b) A point x¯ ∈ X is called a minimizer for f if
x ∈ X, f(x) ≤ f(x¯) ⇒ f(x) = f(x¯).
(c) A set M ⊆ X is called a solution of the problem
minimize f(x) over x ∈ X (P)
if M is an infimizer and each x ∈M is a minimizer for f . A solution M is called
full, if M includes all minimizers for f .
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